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1. Introduction
A great number of studies on the comparative statics for economic behaviors in uncer-
tain economic environments have been done under expected utility settings. The most
common problems are portfolio selections discussed in financial economics and the effects
of stochastic dominance shifts on probability prospects of asset returns or shifts in risk
aversion of investors on optimal portfolios, see e.g. Gollier [4].
One of the reasons why expected utility settings have been widely used for analysis
of decision making under uncertainty is their easy tractability due to the decomposabil-
ity of expected utilities into probability prospects (probability distributions) of risks and
attitudes toward risks (von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN–M) or Bernoulli utility func-
tions, [19]). However, there are many critical discussions regarding the validity of expected
utility settings, see e.g. Machina [12, 13].
When we adopt the expected utility settings for modeling of decision making under
uncertain economic environments, comparative static analysis for the effects of changes
in probability prospects and/or attitudes toward risks become of great interests. There
have been many studies on these respective subjects since the publication of the seminal
papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz [17, 18] for the former and Arrow [1] and Pratt [16]
for the latter. However, only few papers are devoted to comparative static studies in the
frameworks of non–expected utilities.
In this paper, under non–expected utility settings, we analyze comparative statics for
single–period complete financial asset markets with representative investors. We introduce
a bull market measure for uncertain state occurrence and its associated ordering between
representative investors in markets based on their marginal rate of substitution between
equilibrium consumption allocations among possible states by using the TP2 (Totally
Positive of Order 2) concept4). This concept can be combined and generalized with the
likelihood–ratio–dominance (LRD) relation between probability prospects of state occur-
rence (Milgrom [14]) and the Arrow–Pratt ordering of risk aversion (Arrow [1] and Pratt
[16]) in expected utility settings. Therefore, our results are extensions of the previous
results obtained by Milgrom [14] and Ohnishi [15]. Milgrom [14] examined the effects of
LRD shifts in the probability prospect of the representative investor on the risky asset in a
financial market with one risk–free and one risky assets, that is, a market where the 1–fund
separation theorem holds. Ohnishi [15] derived some monotone properties for the effects
of the LRD shifts in probability prospect or changes in the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion of
the representative investor in a complete financial market with multiple assets.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider a single period asset
market model with the representative investor, and examine equilibrium asset prices in
this market. In Section 3, we introduce a bull and bear market measure and its associated
ordering by using the TP2 concept. In Section 4, we analyze the comparative statics for
the bull market effects on equilibrium asset prices, and show that dividend–monotone
asset prices have some monotone properties.
2. Asset Market
Consider a standard single–period asset market model described as follows, see e.g. Duffie
[3] and LeRoy and Werner [11]. This model has two dates indexed by t = 0, 1. The
uncertainty is revealed at t = 1 and is classified into one of S states, indexed by s =
1, . . . , S. In the asset market, there are I investors indexed by i = 1, · · · , I. Each investor
i is characterized by his/her own utility function V i : RS+ → R and an initial endowment
ei = (ei1, . . . , e
i
S)
> ∈ RS+. The utility function V i exhibits investor i’s preference %i
4)TP2 is frequently called Log–Supermodularity in the theory of economics of uncertainty (see, e.g.,
Athey [2] and Gollier [4]). As for the details of the theory of Total Positivity (TP), see Karlin [7], and for
its economic and financial applications, see Jewitt [5, 6], Kijima and Ohnishi [8, 9, 10].
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concerning a consumption allocation ci = (ci1, . . . , c
i
S)
> ∈ RS+ for t = 1 which is planned at
t = 0. We assume that the utility function V i is strictly increasing and strictly concave5).
Notice that we generally consider non–expected utility functions, some comments on a
reduction to the cases of expected utilities are considered in Section 3.2.
The asset market trades N assets indexed by n = 1, · · · , N , and they are characterized
by an S × N dividend matrix D = (dsn; s = 1, · · · , S, n = 1, · · · , N), where dsn is the
amount of the dividend which asset n pays in state s at t = 1. We assume that the
asset market is frictionless and competitive. Further, we assume that the asset market is
complete. That is, the rank of the dividend matrix equals the number of states: rank(D) =
S. We also assume that the asset market does not admit any arbitrage opportunities. That
is, there are no portfolios h = (h1, . . . , hN )> ∈ RN satisfying either of the following two
conditions:
〈q,h〉 ≤ 0; Dh ≥ 0 and Dh 6= 0 (1)
or
〈q,h〉 < 0; Dh ≥ 0, (2)
where q = (q1, . . . , qN )> ∈ RN++ are asset prices. In the theory of asset pricing, it is widely
known that if the asset market does not admit arbitrage opportunities and is complete,
then there exists a unique price system, Arrow–Debreu securities or state securities. The
Arrow–Debreu security s (= 1, . . . , S) or state s security pays one unit of dividend when
state s occurs at t = 1 and nothing elsewhere. We call the prices of the Arrow–Debreu
securities, state prices and denote them as ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψS)> ∈ RS++.
In the asset market, every investor i will maximize his/her utility from a consumption
allocation ci = (ci1, . . . , c
i
S)
> for t = 1 which is planned at t = 0 by purchasing a portfolio
hi = (hi1, . . . , h
i
N )
>. Then, the utility maximization problem of agent i is represented as
follows:
Maximize
ci,hi
V i(ci) (3)
subject to ei +Dhi = ci, (4)
〈q,hi〉 = 0. (5)
We can rewrite the above problem by state prices as follows:
Maximize
ci
V i(ci) (6)
subject to 〈ψ, ci〉 = 〈ψ, ei〉. (7)
The constraints of the above optimization problems are equalities because the utility
function V i is assumed to be strictly increasing.
Next, we define the representative investor in the asset market. The representative
investor has the utility function U defined as follows:
U(c) := sup
c1,··· ,cI
{
I∑
i=1
λiV i(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣
I∑
i=1
ci = c
}
, c ∈ RS+ (8)
where λi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , I; is investor i’s weight. At this time, it is widely known that the
representative investor’s utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave when
5)In this paper, the terms “increasing” and “decreasing” are used in the weak sense, that is, “increasing”
means “nondecreasing” and “decreasing” means “nonincreasing”.
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every investor i’s utility function V i is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Thus,
the constraint
∑I
i=1 c
i = c is an equality. We denote the aggregated endowment: e =∑I
i=1 e
i. Then the representative investor is characterized by his/her utility function
U : RS+ → R and the initial endowment e ∈ RS+. In the equilibrium, we consider the
utility maximization problem of the representative investor in the asset market as follows:
Maximize
c
U(c) (9)
subject to 〈ψ, c〉 = 〈ψ, e〉. (10)
Under this set–up, the representative investor’s consumption allocation is equal to the
aggregated endowment: c = e, in the equilibrium of asset market. Then, by the first
order conditions for optimality of the optimization problem (9), (10), state prices ψs,
s = 1, . . . , S in the equilibrium are represented as follows:
ψs =
∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 es∂sU(e)
, s = 1, . . . , S, (11)
where
∂sU(c) :=
∂U
∂cs
(c), c ∈ RS+ (12)
is the marginal utility function from consumption cs in state s (= 1, . . . , S) at t = 1.
The equilibrium price q of an arbitrary asset or asset portfolio whose dividend in state
s (= 1, . . . , S) at t = 1 is ds, is represented as follows:
q =
S∑
s=1
dsψs. (13)
The equilibrium price qf of the risk–free asset and the risk–free rate Rf are evaluated
as follows:
qf =
S∑
s=1
ψs =
∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 es∂sU(e)
; Rf =
1
qf
=
1∑S
s=1 ψs
=
∑S
s=1 es∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)
. (14)
If we define
βs :=
ψs∑S
s=1 ψs
= Rfψs =
∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)
, s = 1, . . . , S, (15)
then we can consider β = (β1, . . . , βS)> as a probability vector (or a probability mass
function) since βs ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , S; and
∑S
s=1 βs = 1. In the arbitrage pricing theory,
β = (β1, · · · , βS)> is called the risk neutral probability measure or equivalent martingale
measure. By rewriting eq. (13), we obtained the risk neutral evaluation formula for the
equilibrium price of an arbitrary asset whose value in state s (= 1, · · · , S) is ds, as follows:
q =
1
Rf
S∑
s=1
βsds = qf
S∑
s=1
βsds. (16)
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3. Bull and Bear Market
3.1 Definition
In the previous section, we see that an asset market is characterized by a representative
investor j. So we call an asset market with a representative investor j (= 1, 2), as market
j, where representative investor j is characterized by his/her utility function U j : RS+ → R
and an aggregated endowment e =
∑I
i=1 e
i. In this and following sections, without any
loss of generality, we assume that an aggregated endowment is monotone increasing in the
state number:
e1 ≤ . . . ≤ eS . (17)
Now we characterize different attitude to the asset market to introduce the desirability
to states. We reinterpret the marginal utility in state s: ∂sU(e) to be the measure of the
desirability to state s. We call the marginal utility in state s to be reinterpreted, bull
and bear market measure. Note that the consumption allocation c of the representative
investor with strictly increasing utility function is equal to the aggregated endowment
e. Note also that the aggregated endowment is assumed to be monotone increasing in
the state numbers: e1 ≤ . . . ≤ eS . We now introduce an ordering relation between asset
markets. We say that the asset market is more bullish (or more bearish), if the more bullish
(more bearish) asset market prefer the state with higher (lower) consumption allocation
than the less bullish (less bearish) asset market. To get more precise expression, we use
the common economic concept of marginal rate of substitution of consumption allocation
to state m for consumption allocation to state l, which is defined as the ratio of their
marginal utilities:
MRSml(e) :=
∂mU(e)
∂lU(e)
, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S; e ∈ RS+. (18)
Note that el ≤ em for 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S by the assumption on the aggregated endowment.
Then eq. (18) expresses the amount of lower consumption allocation that the investor
must be given to compensate him/her for one unit marginal reduction in higher consump-
tion allocation m. That is, eq. (18) is the relative evaluation of an additional consumption
allocation with higher consumption state m measured by that at state l with lower con-
sumption. In this preparation, we define that for two markets 1 and 2, market 2 is more
bullish than market 1 if the following inequality holds:
MRS1ml(e) :=
∂mU
1(e)
∂lU1(e)
≤ ∂mU
2(e)
∂lU2(e)
=: MRS2ml(e), 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S; e ∈ RS+. (19)
Hence, eq. (19) tells us relative evaluations in more bullish markets at the higher state m
are higher than those in less bullish markets. We redefine the ordering of bull market, eq.
(19) by the use of TP2 (Totally Positive of Order 2) concept.
Definition 3.1. Market 2 is said to be more bullish (less bearish) than market 1 (or
market 1 is said to be more bearish (less bullish) than market 2) at aggregated endowment
e (∈ RS+) if and only if the function ∂sU j(e) is TP2 with respect to s = 1, · · · , S and
j = 1, 2, that is, ∣∣∣∣∂lU1(e) ∂mU1(e)∂lU2(e) ∂mU2(e)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S. (20)
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3.2 The Case of Expected Utility
Until now, we consider U : RS+ → R to be a non–expected utility function. In this subsec-
tion, we assume, for a special case, U : RS+ → R has an expected utility representation:
U(c) =
S∑
s=1
pisu(cs), c ∈ RS+, (21)
where pi = (pi1, . . . , piS)> is a probability vector consisting of a probability prospect pis
that state s occurs at t = 1 with pis ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , S,
∑S
s=1 pis = 1, and u : R+ → R is
a von Neumann–Morgenstern (vN–M) (or Bernoulli) utility function. We further assume
that an investor is risk–averse: u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0. Since a utility function U : RS+ → R with
an expected utility representation is linear in probability, we can decompose it into two
parts: a probability prospect pi and an attitude toward risk represented by a vN–M utility
function u. The effects of the former are investigated with the application of the theory
of stochastic dominances, one of which is the likelihood–ratio–dominance (LRD). For the
latter, Arrow [1] and Pratt [16] consider that the attitude toward risk is represented by
the degree of concavity of vN–M utility function. This is called the Arrow–Pratt Absolute
Risk Aversion (ARA). As discussed later, since effects of shifts in probability prospect
pi and changes in attitude toward risk on decision making, work in the same (opposite)
direction, these concepts could be considered dual in the sense of TP2 (see Gollier [4]).
The observation motivates our introduction of new bull and bear market concepts
We introduce the definition and properties of stochastic dominances used in this and
following sections:
Definition 3.2 (Stochastic Dominances). Let αj = (αj1, . . . , α
j
S), j = 1, 2 be two
probability vectors (or probability mass functions) on {1, . . . , S}.
(1) α2 dominates α1 in the sense of likelihood–ratio–dominance (LRD) if αjs is TP2
(Totally Positive of Order 2) with respect to s = 1, . . . , S and j = 1, 2, that is,∣∣∣∣ α1l α1mα2l α2m
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S. (22)
In this case, we write this as α1 ≤LRD α2.
(2) α2 dominates α1 in the sense of First order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) if
S∑
s=k
α1s ≥
S∑
s=k
α2s, k = 1, . . . , S. (23)
In this case, we write this as α1 ≤FSD α2.
The following theorem is well known in the theory of stochastic dominances. For details
see, e.g., Kijima and Ohnishi [8].
Theorem 3.1. Let αj = (αj1, . . . , α
j
S), j = 1, 2 be two probability vectors (or probability
mass functions) on {1, . . . , S}. We have the followings:
(1) α1 ≤LRD α2 implies α1 ≤FSD α2.
(2) α1 ≤FSD α2 holds if and only if, for any S–dimensional vector f = (f1, . . . , fS) with
increasing components (f1 ≤ . . . ≤ fS), we have
S∑
s=1
α1sfs ≤
S∑
s=1
α2sfs. (24)
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Next, introduce the definition and properties of Arrow–Pratt ordering of risk aversion.
Define the Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) of u in the Arrow–Pratt sense by
A(x;u) := −u
′′(x)
u′(x)
(≥ 0). (25)
Definition 3.3. Let uj (uj ′ > 0, uj ′′ ≤ 0), j = 1, 2 be twice differentiable vN–M utility
functions of two risk averters, defined on a common open interval of the real line R. If it
holds that
A(x;u1) = −u
1′′(x)
u1′(x)
≥ −u
2′′(x)
u2′(x)
= A(x;u2), ∀x, (26)
then u1 is said to be more risk averse than u2 (u2 is said to be more risk tolerant than
u1) in the sense of APRA (Arrow–Pratt Risk Aversion) and in this case, we write this as
u1 ≥APRA u2.
In previous works (e.g., Jewitt [5, 6], Kijima and Ohnishi [9]), the ordering of ARA in
the Arrow–Pratt sense is characterized by the TP2 concept: u1 ≥APRA u2 if and only if:∣∣∣∣ u1′(x) u1′(y)u2′(x) u2′(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0, x ≤ y, (27)
that is, uj ′(x) is TP2 with respect to j = 1, 2 and x.
In the case of expected utility, marginal utility in state s is represented by
∂sU(c) = pisu′(cs), s = 1, . . . , S; c ∈ RS+, (28)
therefore the condition of Definition 3.1 is reduced to the followings: pijsuj ′(es) is TP2 with
respect to s = 1, · · · , S and j = 1, 2, i.e.,∣∣∣∣pi1l u1′(el) pi1mu1′(em)pi2l u2′(el) pi2mu2′(em)
∣∣∣∣ = pi1l u1′(el)pi2mu2′(em)− pi1mu1′(em)pi2l u2′(el) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S.(29)
Each of the conditions pi1 ≤LRD pi2 and u1 ≥APRA u2 is generalized to
pi1l u
1′(el)pi2mu
2′(em)− pi1mu1′(em)pi2l u2′(el) =
∣∣∣∣pi1l u1′(el) pi1mu1′(em)pi2l u2′(el) pi2mu2′(em)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S.(30)
In other words, eq. (30) suggests a set of sufficient condition of Definition 3.2:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that two probability prospects pij , j = 1, 2 and two vN–M
utility functions uj : R+ → R satisfy the following two conditions:
(SD) In the sense of LRD, pi2 dominates pi1, i.e., pi1 ≤LRD pi2;
(RA) In the sense of APRA, market 1 is more risk averse than market 2, i.e., u1 ≥APRA u2.
Then the conditions of Definition 3.1. are satisfied.
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4. Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine some comparative statics on equilibrium prices of three
types of assets or asset portfolios as follows:
Definition 4.1.
(RF) Assets and/or portfolios that pay one unit of consumption as a dividend in all states.
That is, the asset whose dividend ds in state s is 1 in every state s (= 1, · · · , S), i.e.,
d1 = · · · = dS = 1. We call this type of assets risk–free assets;
(MI) Assets and/or portfolios that pay dividends which are monotonic increasing in states,
i.e., d1 ≤ · · · ≤ dS . We call this type of assets MI (Monotone Increasing) assets;
(MD) Assets and/or portfolios that pay dividends which are monotonic decreasing in states,
i.e., d1 ≥ · · · ≥ dS . We call this type of assets MD (Monotone Decreasing) assets.
By eq. (14) in Section 2, the equilibrium price qf of the risk–free asset and the risk–free
rate Rf are evaluated as
qf =
S∑
s=1
ψs =
∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 es∂sU(e)
; Rf =
1
qf
=
1∑S
s=1 ψs
=
∑S
s=1 es∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)
. (31)
In the remaining of this subsection, we consider two markets, market 1 and 2 for
comparative static analysis and assume that market 2 is more bullish than market 1
(market 1 is more bearish than market 2). In this set–up, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose two markets and assume that one market is more bullish than
the other market. Then, the risk–free rate in a more bullish market is higher than that
in a less bullish market. Or equivalently, the equilibrium price of the risk–free asset in
a more bullish market is lower than that in a less bullish market. That is, the following
relations hold:
R1f ≤ R2f and q1f ≥ q2f . (32)
Proof. Define
αjs :=
∂sU
j(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU
j(e)
, j = 1, 2. (33)
Then, we can rewrite the risk–free rates by using αjs, s = 1, · · · , S as:
Rjf =
S∑
s=1
αjses, j = 1, 2. (34)
Notice that αj = (αj1, · · · , αjS)>, j = 1, 2 are considered as probability vectors (or proba-
bility mass functions), since αjs ≥ 0, s = 1, · · · , S;
∑S
s=1 α
j
s = 1.
Now we show that
α2s
α1s
is monotone increasing in s. (35)
By definition of αjs, s = 1, · · · , S, j = 1, 2, we have
α2s
α1s
=
∑S
s=1 ∂sU
1(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU
2(e)
· ∂sU
2(e)
∂sU1(e)
. (36)
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Since, by Definition 3.1,
∂lU
2(e)
∂lU1(e)
≤ ∂mU
2(e)
∂mU1(e)
, 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S, (37)
the second factor of the right hand side in eq. (36) is monotone increasing in s so that the
likelihood ratio α2s/α
1
s is monotone increasing in s. Since α
j , j = 1, 2 can be considered
as probability vectors (or probability mass functions), α2 dominates α1 in the sense of
LRD, i.e., α1 ≤LRD α2. In the previous section, we know that the stochastic order of
LRD implies the stochastic order of FSD. We assume that e1 ≤ . . . ≤ eS so that we obtain
R1f =
S∑
s=1
α1ses ≤
S∑
s=1
α2ses = R
2
f , (38)
or equivalently,
q1f =
1
R1f
≥ 1
R2f
= q2f . (39)
Theorem 4.2. Let us consider the risk–free asset as a nume`rare. The relative price of
an MI (MD) asset in a more bullish (more bearish) market is higher than that in a less
bullish (less bearish) market. That is, the following inequalities hold:
q1MI
q1f
≤ q
2
MI
q2f
while
q1MD
q1f
≥ q
2
MD
q2f
, (40)
where qjMI and q
j
MD are prices of an MI asset and MD asset, respectively.
Proof. We define
βs :=
ψs∑S
s=1 ψs
= Rfψs =
∂sU(e)∑S
s=1 ∂sU(e)
, s = 1, · · · , S, (41)
then we can consider β = (β1, · · · , βS)> as a probability vector (a probability mass func-
tion) since
βs ≥ 0, s = 1, · · · , S;
S∑
s=1
βs = 1. (42)
By eq. (16) of Section 2, an equilibrium relative price of an asset whose value in state s
(= 1, · · · , S) is ds, can be evaluated as
q
qf
= Rfq = Rf
S∑
s=1
dsψs =
S∑
s=1
βsds. (43)
We can prove the theorem in a similar way to the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Here, MI (MD) assets are characterized below. MI (MD) assets have the property that
more high dividends are realized when higher (lower) consumption allocations are realized.
In other words, MI (MD) assets pay higher dividends in economic boom (slowdown).
Finally, we give an economic interpretation of the result of Theorem 4.2. Definition 3.1
can be rewritten as;
MRS1ml(e) ≤ MRS2ml(e) and MRS1lm(e) ≥ MRS2lm(e), 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ S; e ∈ RS+, (44)
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where MRSml(lm)(e) is marginal rate of substitution of consumption allocation to state
m(l) for consumption allocation to state l(m). In other words, eq. (44) tells us the relative
evaluation of an additional consumption allocation with higher (lower) consumption state
m(l) measured by that at state l(m) with lower (higher) consumption of more bullish (more
bearish) markets is higher than less bullish (less bearish) markets. From the assumption of
dividends of MI (MD) assets, the demand of MI (MD) assets in more bullish (more bearish)
markets is relatively higher than that in less bullish (less bearish) markets. Therefore the
equilibrium price of MI (MD) assets in more bullish (more bearish) markets is higher than
that in less bullish (less bearish) markets.
5. Concluding Remarks
For single–period complete financial asset markets with representative investors, we intro-
duced a bull market measure for uncertain state occurrence and its associated ordering
between representative investors in markets based on their marginal rate of substitution
between equilibrium consumption allocations among possible states. By analyzing the
comparative statics for bull market effects on equilibrium asset prices, we derive some
monotone properties of the risk–free rate and discounted prices of dividend–monotone
assets. These results are extensions of the previous results based on the likelihood–ratio–
dominance relation between probability prospects of state occurrence and the Arrow–Pratt
ordering of risk aversion under expected utility settings.
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